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Shaffer v. Heitner: A SINGLE TEST FOR STATE COURT
JURISDICTION
INTRODUCTION
In the recent decision of Shaffer v. Heitner,' the United
States Supreme Court significantly changed the test for state
court jurisdiction. The Court ended the traditional distinction
between actions against persons and actions against property. It
asserted that all state court jurisdiction must be based on the test
of fairness to the defendant, as delineated in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington.2
Prior to the ruling in Shaffer, a foreign defendant who did not
have sufficient contacts with the forum state was not subject to
in personam jurisdiction in that state.' However, the plaintiff was
not without recourse. If the defendant owned property in the
forum state, that property could be attached in a quasi in rem
action, giving the state jurisdiction over that property in answer-
ing any claims against the unavailable property owner.' The de-
fendant's property was the basis for jurisdiction and the means
to satisfy any adverse judgment. There was no concern for the
defendant's contacts with the forum state.
The effect of the ruling in Shaffer is to prohibit quasi in rem
actions against property if, after an examination, there are no ties
between the defendant property owner, the forum state, and the
nature of the litigation. A state no longer has automatic jurisdic-
tion over property within its borders. Instead, it must have juris-
diction over the property owner, and that determination rests in
International Shoe. 5
This new focus on the property owner does not preclude the
possibility that the presence of the defendant's property in the
forum state may have a bearing on the existence of jurisdiction
over him. But, the property has significance only in evidencing
ties and contacts between the defendant and the forum state.
Also, the presence of the defendant's property may have no bear-
'433 U.S. 186 (1977).
2 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See text accompanying notes 24-28 infra.




ing on the existence of jurisdiction if that property is unrelated
to the cause of action.
In applying this new test to the facts in Shaffer, the Supreme
Court determined that nonresidents of Delaware were not subject
to that state's jurisdiction, even though they owned property
within the state. This lack of jurisdiction reflected the absence of
any tie between the owners' property contact with the state and
the nature of the litigation.! Furthermore, the attachment stat-
ute, which brought the property before the Delaware court, did
not comport with the International Shoe test.'
I. TRADITIONAL BASIS FOR JURISDICTION
A. Pennoyer v. Neff
Of major significance in Shaffer was the demise of the tradi-
tional justifications for state jurisdiction to adjudicate. Much of
the traditional theory was enumerated by Justice Field in the 100
year old decision of Pennoyer v. Neff. Under Pennoyer each state
had jurisdiction over all persons and all property within its bor-
ders. Conversely, no state had jurisdiction over persons and prop-
erty outside of its borders. 0 However, if a person outside of the
state's borders left property within the state, the state had juris-
diction over the property in determining any claims against the
unavailable property owner." Such quasi in rem actions were
direct against the property and indirect against the property
owner. 2 Jurisdiction over the property was automatic as long as
the property was brought before the court by attachment or se-
questration. 3
One important characteristic of quasi in rem actions was that
the satisfaction of an adverse judgment was limited to the value
Id. at 213-16.
Id. at 213-14.
95 U.S. 714 (1877). The Court in Shaffer overruled Pennoyer to the extent that it
was inconsistent with its new holding. 433 U.S. at 212 n.39.
IC 95 U.S. at 722 (1877).
Id. at 723.
i Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1977). As a result, courts did not require
personal service on the property owner.
" In Pennoyer the property was not properly attached. Thus, the court could not
proceed quasi in rem against the land because it was not before the court. 95 U.S. at 727.
Since the ruling in Pennoyer, the Supreme Court has made it necessary to augment
attachment with the most reasonably available method of personal notice. See, Schroeder
v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
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of the jurisdictional property.' The property owner could appear
specially to defend the property, without incurring personal lia-
bility, because the action remained against the property. 5
Of additional significance in Shaffer was the divisibility of
quasi in rem actions into two categories, depending on the rela-
tionship the property had to the nature of the litigation." In the
first category were actions where the attached property provided
the basis for jurisdiction and also was specifically related to the
underlying claim. One example of this first category was attach-
ment of mortgaged property in a foreclosure action. 7 The second
category embodied situations where the attached property pro-
vided only the basis for jurisdiction. The underlying claim had no
relation to the attached property. 8 The quasi in rem action in
Shaffer fell within this second category."9 There the underlying
claim was the supposed breach of fiduciary duties by the directors
and officers of Greyhound Corp.20 The sequestered personal stock
property of the defendants, the basis of Delaware's assertion of
jurisdiction, was wholly unrelated to a determination of any
breach of their corporate responsibilities.
2'
B. From Pennoyer to International Shoe
The history of state court jurisdiction following the Pennoyer
concepts of power over persons and property was marked by ob-
lique attempts to expand these jurisdictional confines to meet the
needs of an increasingly mobile society. As the country devel-
oped, it was no longer practical to restrict state jurisdiction to
' Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977).
" Because the action is against the property, res judicata does not apply if the plain-
tiff seeks to bring the suit in another jurisdiction where the owner is subject to in personam
liability. See Bruns Bros. v. Central R.R., 202 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1953). Partly due to this
reason, some states allow the owner to appear only in personam in defense of his property.
This prevents a bifurcation of the suit and potential double liability. See, DEL. CODE tit.
10, § 366 (1974).
1' Folk & Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware, a Constitutional Analysis, 73 COLUM. L.
Rav. 749, 782-89 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Folk & Moyer].
"7 Other typical quasi in rem actions falling within this first category include clouds
on title, enforcement of judicial liens, and establishment and determination of rights in a
trust. Id. at 782.
id. at 784.
433 U.S. at 208-09.
2 See text accompanying note 40 infra.
11 433 U.S. at 213. The Court wrote that the "property is not the subject matter of
this litigation, nor is the underlying cause of action related to the property."
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persons and property within state boundaries. As a consequence,
the courts developed encompassing legal fictions of implied con-
sent and implied presence, thus creating jurisdiction compatible
with Pennoyer.2' Similarly, the state legislatures enacted long
arm statutes to obtain jurisdictions over nonresident auto drivers
who caused damage in the state.2 3 In these situations, the state
had no real physical power over the foreign defendants, as re-
quired under Pennoyer, but it was necessary that such defendants
be subject to suit for their wrongs.
In response, the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington2 expanded and redefined the conceptual basis for
state court jurisdiction. No longer was the focus on physical
power over persons within the state's boundaries. Instead, the
Court ruled that the jurisdictional test for in personam jurisdic-
tion rested on a finding of minimum contacts between the defen-
dant and the forum state. 25 Thus, no state had the power to make
"binding a judgment in personam against any individual or cor-
porate defendant with which the state ha[d] no contacts ties or
relations."" Foreign defendants were subject to suit only if they
had sufficient contacts with the forum.27 The Court had little
concern for the Pennoyer concept of the power of the state.,, The
rationale for this new ruling was based on expanded notions of
due process fairness.2'
2 Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930). See, Kurtland, The
Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and In Personam Jurisdiction of State
Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569, 577-86 (1958).
2 "The advent of automobiles, with the concomitant increase in the incidence of
individuals causing injury in states where they were not subject to in personam actions
under Pennoyer, required further moderation of territorial limits on jurisdictional power."
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 202 (1977). See, Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
24 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
23 Id. at 316.
n Id. at 319.
2 See generally, McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 255 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (Texas
life insurance company subject to suit in California even though its only contact with the
state was a policy with a California resident); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71
Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969) (The Court said that jurisdiction
reflected a balancing of inconveniences to the nonresident defendant versus the interests
of the state and the local plaintiff); Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary
Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) (Parts manufacturer was liable in Illinois
because it was inferrable that products which incorporated its parts were used in Illinois).
2 326 U.S. at 316.
The Court in International Shoe wrote:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is
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One major aspect of the old Pennoyer rationale which re-
mained untouched by the International Shoe ruling was the
state's jurisdictional power over property within its borders. The
Court retained the old premise that quasi in rem actions were
against property and not the property owner. If the property law
lay within the state it was subject to attachment and sale to
answer any claim against the property owner. There was no con-
cern for the property owner's minimum contacts with the forum
state, even though he may have lacked such contacts. One judge
recently referred to this situation as an "irrational bifurcation of
International Shoe. "30
The continued validity of quasi in rem actions against prop-
erty often resulted in great unfairness to the property owner. The
injustice was most visible in two situations. First, if the property
was intangible, its situs was often arbitrarily attached to the
forum state through the use of legal fictions. Such fictions usually
operated without the knowledge or control of the property owner.
An illustrative fiction was the Harris v. Balk doctrine 3' which
allowed a creditor's debt to be attached wherever the debtor could
be served. A similarly fetching situation occurred in Shaffer v.
Heitner. There a Delaware statute placed the situs of all stock in
Delaware corporations in Delaware, 32 regardless of the location of
the stock certificate or stockholder's domicile. The remaining
states place situs where the stock certificate lies.33 These varying
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. . . .But now
that the capis ad respondendum has given way to personal service of sum-
mons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts ....
326 U.S. at 315.
1 Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130, 1132-33 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gib-
bons, J., concurring).
" 198 U.S. 215 (1905). In Harris, Harris and Balk were residents of North Carolina.
Epstein was a resident of Maryland. Epstein had a claim against Balk but had no way to
serve Balk in Maryland. However, Epstein was able to obtain jurisdiction by attaching
an unrelated debt which Harris owed to Balk. The attachment occurred when Harris was
present in Maryland (debt attaches to the debtor). Later, Balk was prevented from collect-
ing the debt owed to him by Harris because it had already been used to satisfy Epstein's
claim against Balk. Such a ruling is unlikely under Shaffer because the focus of jurisdic-
tion in Maryland would be on Balk, not the location of the debt (Balk's property), and
Balk had no other contacts with the forum state. See, 433 U.S. at 212 n.39.




rules could have resulted in attachment of the stock in two juris-
dictions at once.3
The other injustice occurred in the use of quasi in rem actions
of the second category, where the attached property was not the
subject of the controversy. Fairness to the property owner was
often subverted because of the lack of any meaningful nexus be-
tween the basis for jurisdiction (the presence of property) and the
controversy. If the property was attachable in the state, the owner
was subject to suit to the extent of the value of the property. 5 The
nature of the suit was not restricted to obligations arising out of
the property. Thus, if Jones lived in state B and owned property
in state C, another resident of state B conceivably could sue Jones
in state C on a matter unrelated to the attached property.
I. Shaffer v. Heitner
Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware, owned one share of stock
in Greyhound Corporation. 31 Greyhound was incorporated in Del-
aware but had its principal place of business in Arizona. 7 In 1974
Heitner filed a stockholder's derivative suit in Delaware against
Greyhound,39 a subsidiary, and twenty-eight present and former
directors and officers of Greyhound. The complaint alleged, in
part, that the directors and officers were liable individually for
breaching their fiduciary duties. The breach occurred when they
directed the corporation in activities which caused the corpora-
tion to become subject to criminal fines and civil damages. 0
None of the directors or officers was a resident of Delaware,
nor were any of them at any time physically within Delaware.4
3 Note, U.S. Industries Inc. v. Gregg, 38 U. Prrr. L. Rzv. 789, 806-07 (1977).
See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra.
N Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 189 (1977).
37 Id.
" Id. The action was brought in the Court of Chancery, New Castle County, Delaware
on May 22, 1974.
0 In a stockholder's derivative suit, the corporation is a named defendant, resulting
from its failure to assert the claim on its own behalf. This failure makes the corporation
an indispensable party. See, Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 428 (1903).
0 Greyhound was found guilty in a criminal suit of a violation of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act. The court levied fines totalling $600,000 against Greyhound and a subsidiary,
Greyhound Lines. United States v. Greyhound Corp., 363 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ill. 1973),
aff'd, 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974). In a related civil suit, a judgment of $13,146,090, plus
attorneys' fees, was entered against Greyhound. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound
Corp., 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977).
1 The majority wrote that Heitner "did not allege and does not now claim that the
appellants have ever set foot in Delaware." 433 U.S. at 213.
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However, twenty-one of them did own stock in Greyhound Corpo-
ration, and, under Delaware law, all stock issued by a Delaware
corporation had its ownership situs in that state.4 2 Based on this
presence of property in Delaware, Heitner successfully moved to
have the Greyhound stock of these twenty-one defendants seques-
tered.43 Under the statute, if the defendants had wished to defend
their property they could have done so only by making a general
appearance in Delaware."
The twenty-one defendants did not attempt to defend on the
merits of the controversy."5 Instead, they appeared specially in a
Delaware Court of Chancery and moved to vacate the sequestra-
tion of their stock. They contended that Delaware did not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy because they, the de-
fendants, did not have personal contacts with the state, as re-
quired under the test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington. "6
Both the Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme
Court47 rejected the defendants' jurisdictional attack. Each court
ruled that Heitner had instituted a quasi in rem action against
the sequestered stock property.4 ' Thus, the fact that Delaware did
not have jurisdiction over the defendants individually was irrele-
vant because the state had proper jurisdiction over their prop-
erty.4'
11 DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (1974). See, text accompanying notes 62-66 infra.
3 DEL. CODE tit. 10 § 366 (1974). Sequestration in Delaware is the equitable counter-
part to attachment at law. Both may be used to obtain quasi in rem or in rem jurisdiction.
See, Sands v. Lefcourt Realty Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 340, 344, 117 A.2d 365, 367 (1955).
" Section 366 provided if the defendant did not appear in personam the court had
power to use the sequestered property in satisfaction of a default judgment. If the defen-
dant did appear, then the judgment was personal and not limited to the value of the
sequestered property. See generally, Folk and Moyer, supra note 16, at 789-94.
,1 Since the remaining seven directors and officers owned no property in Delaware the
actions against them were apparently dismissed for failure to secure jurisdiction. 433 U.S.
at 214.
0 They also contended that the sequestration was ex parte, denying them procedural
due process. See, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (the defendant had to receive
notice and a right to be heard prior to any taking of her property). Here, however, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the sequestration was an extraordinary situation
which justified the ex parte taking. Greyhound v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 231 (Del. 1977).
See, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969) (extraordinary situations
may justify a taking prior to notice and hearing).
'" See, Greyhound v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (Del. 1977),
LA 361 A.2d at 229.
0 The Delaware Supreme Court wrote:
There are significant constitutional questions at issue here but we say at once
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On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed. The
Court applied the jurisdictional test of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, as the defendants had urged. It rationalized its rul-
ing on the newly adopted premise that all actions quasi in rem
were really actions to determine persons' interests in property. 0
Such actions were against the property owners not the property.
Since the action in Shaffer was against the officers and directors
and not the stock, jurisdiction existed only if Delaware could have
exerted jurisdiction over them personally. The effect of this hold-
ing shifted the focus away from the state's power over the nonresi-
dent's property in the state to a determination of sufficient ties
among the defendant, the state, and the litigation.51 The Court
in Shaffer emphasized, contrary to traditional theory, that the
property owner was the real party in interest, and jurisdiction
over his interests in property within the state was permissible
only when he could be brought properly before the court.
Since Delaware had been concerned only with the presence
of the defendants' property when it took jurisdiction," it had
acted, said the Court, contrary to the International Shoe test.
Furthermore, in re-examining the facts in light of International
Shoe, the Court did not find sufficient ties among the defendants,
the state, and the litigation to permit the controversy to be tried
in Delaware. 3
III. ANALYSIS OF THE HOLDING IN Shaffer v. Heitner
A. Narrow Approaches Under Delaware Law
Considering the long case history which the decision in
that we do not deem the rule in International Shoe to be one .... The
reason of course, is that the jurisdiction under § 366 remains . . . quasi in
rem founded on the presence of the capital stock here, not on prior contacts
by the defendants with the forum.
Id.
433 U.S. at 207. The Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the defendants'
claim that the sequestration was a violation of procedural due process. See note 46 supra.
For an analysis of potential procedural due process issues in attachment to gain jurisdic-
tion, see Note, Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82 YALE L. REV.
1023 (1973).
11 433 U.S. at 204. This decision followed several recent lower court opinions. See,
U.S. Indus. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977); Jonnet
v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring).
52 433 U.S. at 213. "The Delaware courts based their assertion of jurisdiction in this
case solely on the statutory presence of appellants' property in Delaware."
Id. at 213-16. But see, text accompanying notes 94-95 infra.
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Shaffer overturned, a serious question arises as to whether the
Court needed to take such pervasive action. It is maintainable
that narrower avenues could have brought equal results."
1. The Nature of Delaware's Sequestration Statute
In the first instance, the Delaware courts rejected the defen-
dants' jurisdictional challenge because the action was quasi in
rem, due to the sequestration of the defendants' stock under title
10, section 366 of the Delaware Code." The Supreme Court in
Shaffer accepted the quasi in rem label and went on to attack the
general soundness of such actions.5 However, section 366 resulted
in litigation which lacked fundamental characteristics of tradi-
tional quasi in rem actions.
In describing the general nature of quasi in rem actions, Jus-
tice Marshall in Shaffer wrote that the judgment in such suits
was "limited to the property that supports jurisdiction and does
not impose a personal liability on the property owner since he is
not before the court."5 Section 366 had a quite different effect.
The statute did not limit judgments to the value of the property
because the owner could defend his property only by submitting
to full in personam liability." It is significant that in its earlier
Jurisdictional Statement the Court emphasized that section 366
was an assertion of in personam jurisdiction, causing
International Shoe to control." Furthermore, the Court suggested
that the Delaware statute was not a legitimate exercise of quasi
in rem jurisdiction because it did not afford the owner of the
property an unconditional opportunity to defend the property.60
11 Because jurisdiction involves substantive due process issues the Supreme Court
normally refrained from making broad rulings when narrower avenues existed. See, Ash-
wander v. Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1974).
433 U.S. at 196.
Id. at 199.
It is true that in the initial sense section 366 is quasi in rem because jurisdiction
rests on the sequestration of the property, not control over the defendant. But any defense
of the property is not quasi in rem.
15 Shaffer v. Heitner, 429 U.S. 813, Jurisdictional Statement, No. 75 1812, at 13
(October term, 1976) (not for general publication) [hereinafter cited as Jurisdictional
Statement]. Even in the Court's full opinion it recognized Delaware's motive by writing,
"the express purpose of the Delaware sequestration procedure is to compel the defendant
to enter a personal appearance." 433 U.S. at 209.
"0 The Court wrote that "if Delaware were to exercise legitimate quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion it would necessarily afford the owner of the property an unconditional opportunity
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Thus, the Court could have decided Shaffer by simply ruling
section 366 unconstitutional because it would force the defen-
dants to submit to in personam jurisdiction in contravention to
the International Shoe due process test.
Perhaps one reason the Court did not base its final holding
in Shaffer on section 366 was an attempt to avoid a labeling
process. The Court had ruled previously that labeling an action
in personam or in rem was an elusive and confused undertaking."
But, if this reason were true, the Court was inconsistent in its
approach when it ventured in its Jurisdictional Statement to
label section 366 as fundamentally in personam.
2. Delaware's Situs of Corporate Stock Statute
If the Court had wished to avoid labeling the action in
personam, it still had one other narrow avenue which it might
have used. Under the traditional concept of quasi in rem actions,
Delaware gained jurisdiction by sequestering stock property
which was located within its borders. However, the stock prop-
erty, an intangible asset, 2 had its situs in Delaware only by virtue
of title 8, section 169 of the Delaware Code. 3 Section 169 provided
that Delaware was the situs of all stock in corporations formed
in Delaware. This provision was contrary to U.C.C. 8-317(1) 61
which provided that the stock certificate was the actual evidence
of the stock, and attachment occurred only when the certificate
actually was seized. Thus, the defendants were subject to suit in
Delaware and also in whatever state the certificates were located.
Because of this inconsistency, section 169 may have denied
the defendants due process of law. 5 If section 169 were unconsti-
tutional, Delaware would have had no basis for jurisdiction be-
cause the property would not have been within its borders either
to be heard and would limit any judgment in the proceedings to the property involved."
Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 59, at 16.
" In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., the Court would not permit
due process to depend on classifications of the action as in personam or in rem. 338 U.S.
306, 312 (1950).
62 Folk & Moyer, supra note 16, at 788.
DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (1974). The stock certificates were physically located outside
of Delaware. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 192 (1977).
" "No attachment or levy upon a security or any share or other interest ... shall be
valid until the security is actually seized . See, Folk & Moyer, supra note 16, at
788 n.221.
" Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 59, at 16.
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physically or by statutory fiction. Again, the Court recognized
this potential avenue in its Jurisdictional Statement."
B. Contrasting Views of the International Shoe Elements of
Fairness in Actions Involving Property
1. The Majority Opinion in Shaffer v. Heitner
Of major significance in the majority opinion was the conclu-
sion that quasi in rem actions could no longer be maintained by
a simple attachment of property within the forum state. The
Court refused to accept the traditional premise that the action
was against the land and not the landowner. 7 Since the property
owner was the real party in interest, jurisdiction over him could
result only if he were sued on matters which related directly to
his contacts, if any, with the forum state. 8 Such a view was
realistic and fair under the International Shoe test.
The majority did recognize that in some situations the litiga-
tion might concern the defendant's property in the forum state.
In that case the property would be significant in evidencing a tie
between the defendant's contacts with the state and the nature
of the litigation. However, the presence of the property would be
only one factor supporting jurisdiction, 9 making the action unlike
traditional quasi in rem actions where the presence of the prop-
erty was the sole factor.
Since the presence of the defendant's property was only one
factor, the majority suggested other factors relating to property
which might have a bearing on the existence of jurisdiction.
Among these considerations were the defendant's reasonable ex-
pectancy, the state's interest in the marketability of its property,
the location of property records and witnesses, and the interest
of the state in resolving disputes concerning its citizens.70 By
raising these factors, the Court demonstrated the many variables
that might go into a determination of jurisdiction.
However, the Court did note that the presence of the defen-
uId.
' "We think the time is ripe to consider whether the standard of fairness and sub-
stantial justice set forth in International Shoe should be held to govern actions in rem as
well as in personam." 433 U.S. at 206.
"Id. at 207.




dant's property in the forum state would be an overwhelming
factor supporting jurisdiction over the defendant where the litiga-
tion involved that property.7 Conversely, the property would
have little significance in evidencing ties where that property was
unrelated to the underlying claim.7" The majority test for jurisdic-
tion over the defendant included not only the defendant's con-
tacts with the forum state, but how, if at all, those contacts
related to the litigation.73 Thus, the Court effectively reshaped
the International Shoe test by emphasizing a three-cornered eval-
uation; the defendant, the forum, and the underlying claim must
all interrelate. Once such a potentially lengthy determination is
made, the forum state has full in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant.7"
2. The Concurring Opinions
In contrast to the majority approach were the concurring
opinions of Justices Stevens and Powell. Justice Stevens hypoth-
esized that fairness did not necessarily result from a showing of
ties between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." In
exemplary cases where the defendant drives through the forum
state, opens a bank account, or purchases real estate, Justice
Stevens believed it was fair to maintain jurisdiction over the
defendant because the defendant could be charged with
expecting that his activities would subject him to potential liabil-
ity." If a nonresident accepted the benefits of the forum state he
would be charged with assuming concomitant obligations.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 213.
73 Id. at 208-09.
1' Id. at 203-04.
" Id. at 217 (Steven, J., concurring).
75 Id.
" In some respects Justice Stevens' opinion followed a theory of implied consent
expressed in dicta in Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). There the Court theorized
that if the defendant left property in a state and then absented himself from that state,
the state then had jurisdiction over such property in answering all claims against the
absent defendant. It was said that the defendant gave his consent ex necessitate to such
potential liability against his property.
The majority in Shaffer did make negative reference to Ownbey but it is unclear
whether the Court was referring to this aspect of the decision or the procedural question
on which the case turned. 433 U.S. at 194 n.10. In U.S. Indus. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142, 153
(3d Cir. 1976) the court refused to support the consent ex necessitate concept as the sole
basis for jurisdiction because it was only dicta.
VOL. 55
SCHAFFER v. HEITNER
Expectancy was also an important consideration in the ma-
jority opinion. But the majority did not limit the jurisdictional
test solely to a finding of expectancy. It went on to suggest other
factors which might have a bearing on the sufficiency of ties
between the defendant, the forum state, and the litigation. 8 For
Stevens, however, a finding of expectancy embodied due process
fairness to the property owner."9 Since expectancy can be attrib-
uted to anyone who knowingly leaves property in another state,
there was very little difference between this approach and tradi-
tional quasi in rem jurisdiction. In quasi in rem actions, if the
property was located within the state, the nonresident was sub-
ject to suit. 0 Under Stevens' hypothesis, if the property was in
the state, the nonresident property owner could be charged with
an expectancy and was therefore subject to its jurisdiction. The
only exception would be where intangible property was located
arbitrarily in the forum state.
The concurrence was also contrary to the majority opinion in
that Stevens did not limit the imputed expectancy of the defen-
dant to obligations arising out of the defendant's contacts with
the forum state.8' Since knowingly possessing property in another
state always creates contacts between the defendant and that
state, it is essential under the International Shoe test that poten-
tial liability be limited to obligations arising out of the ownership
of the property. This factor the majority repeatedly stressed. If
not limited, the charge of expectancy would foster the same
abuses that existed under quasi in rem actions of the second
category; the property owner could be held liable on matters un-
related to his contacts with the forum state.
It is noteworthy that under both the majority and Stevens'
views no property owner could be charged with expecting suit in
another state if he did not know that his property was within that
state. Thus, Stevens was able to concur in the judgment because
the defendants' stock property was present in Delaware only by
" See text accompanying note 70 supra.
"' "I would also not read it [the majority opinion] as invalidating other long accepted
methods of acquiring jurisdiction over persons with adequate notice of both the particular
controversy and also that their local activities might subject them to suit." 433 U.S. at
217, 218-19 (Stevens, J., concurring).
* See text accompanying note 11 supra.
* Stevens made no mention of any requirement other than a tie between the state
and the defendant which created the expectancy. 433 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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the arbitrary workings of section 169. The defendants could not
be charged with knowledge of the quirks of Delaware situs fictions
when they purchased stock on the open market.82
However, if the facts in Shaffer had been changed slightly it
is unlikely that Stevens would have concurred. If the defendants
had left the stock certificates in Delaware, under Stevens' ap-
proach the defendants could have been charged with expecting
suit because they knowingly left their property in the state. Thus,
the stock could have been applied to satisfy any adverse judg-
ment for breach of their unrelated fiduciary duties. Under the
majority view, the location of the stock certificates would not
have changed the results. There still would have been no tie be-
tween the defendants' stock (their only contact with Delaware)
and the controversy. The fact that there was no connection be-
tween the defendants' contacts with Delaware and the underlying
claim was a controlling fact for the majority.
Justice Powell's concurrence13 was similar in effect to Justice
Stevens' approach. Powell reserved judgment on the necessity of
meeting the International Shoe test for a nonresident, if that
person owned property which was indisputably and permanently
located in the forum state.14 Powell specifically supported the
majority shift in focus to a determination of fairness over the
property owner.15 But, Powell, like Stevens, did not view a finding
of ties between the defendant, the forum state, and the litigation
as the only method for achieving that fairness.86 Powell asserted
s2 Id. Lack of expectancy also would flaw jurisdiction under the Harris v. Balk doc-
trine. See note 31 supra.
Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
Powell wrote:
I would explicitly reserve judgment, however, on whether the ownership of
some forms of property whose situs is indisputably and permanently located
within a State may, without more, provide the contacts necessary to subject
a defendant to jurisdiction within the State to the extent of the value of the
property.
Id.
R5 "I agree that the principles of International Shoe Co. v. Washington . . . should
be extended to govern assertions of in rem as well as in personam jurisdiction . 433
U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
" One commentator has suggested recently that not only are quasi in rem actions
involving real property fair but, in many instances, such actions are fairer than the
International Shoe standard. He reasoned that a nonresident property owner had only a
casual interest in the forum state arising from his property there. Thus, under the tradi-
tional rules of actions against property he was only subject to liability up to the value of
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that his test, based on the permanence of the property, was suffi-
ciently fair to the property owner. 87
3. Which Standard to Use
Because both the majority and concurring views often would
achieve the same results,88 it is essential to examine their methods
of determining jurisdiction. The majority directed the jurisdic-
tional determination toward a fluid process involving a poten-
tially large number of considerations. The concurrences were
more mechanical, resulting in a simpler approach to the jurisdic-
tional question. Simplicity is particularly beneficial because the
determination of jurisdiction is, after all, a threshold issue. 9 It is
also true that the reservations expressed in the concurrences con-
cerned fact situations which were not before the Court in
Shaffer. 10
However, both concurrences, in their simplicity, failed to
consider restrictions on the jurisdictional test which the majority
found central. The jurisdictional test, under the majority view,
centered on a weighing of significant factors, as they related to
ties among the defendant, the forum state, and the litigation. A
finding of such ties necessarily resulted in a limitation on jurisdic-
tion to obligations arising out of the defendant's contacts with the
forum state.9 ' The concurrences failed to make any such limita-
tions. Since the Court held that the International Shoe test is the
only test for state court jurisdiction, and since the majority
his property contact. Because he did have some contact with the state, it was fair to hold
him accountable. But it was not fair to make him liable personally. See, Smit, The
Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L.
Rav. 600, 627-28 (1977).
0 "In the case of real property, in particular, preservation of the common law concept
of quasi in rem jurisdiction arguably would avoid the uncertainty of the general
International Shoe standard without a significant cost to 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.'" 433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
However, Powell, like Stevens, made no mention of restrictions on liability to obliga-
tions arising out of the owner's contacts with the state. See text accompanying note 81
supra.
1 433 U.S. at 207. The majority wrote that "it would be unusual for the state where
the property is located not to have jurisdiction."
Adjudication of the merits cannot proceed if the state has no jurisdiction over the
parties. E.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 314 (1945).
" Powell specifically reserved judgment on types of property other than that involved
in Shaffer. 433 U.S. at 127 (Powell, J., concurring). Stevens was unsure as to the poten-
tially broad reach of the holding. 433 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J., concurring).
" See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
stressed that the defendant's contacts must relate to the litiga-
tion, not considering these limitations would result in an incom-
plete jurisdictional test. 2 Furthermore, the Court held previously
that it will not consider simplifying the jurisdictional test for the
sake of judicial convenience . 3 Consequently, a finding of ties be-
tween the defendant, the forum state, and the nature of the litiga-
tion is the definitive test for all assertions of state court jurisdic-
tion.
C. Application of the International Shoe Test to the Facts in
Shaffer
Under International Shoe, the majority established that the
defendants' sequestered stock property did not evidence suffi-
cient contacts between the defendants and Delaware in regard to
the fiduciary breach (the underlying claim). The stock was unre-
lated. However, Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part,9" strongly disagreed with the majority's failure to find,
on reexamination, other ties between the defendants and Dela-
ware concerning these fiduciary duties owed to Greyhound. Bren-
nan viewed as a sufficient contact the directors' association with
a corporation which existed solely by the grace of Delaware law. 5
In contrast, the majority found determinative the failure of
Delaware to assert, through statutory enactment, its power to
regulate corporate fiduciary responsibilities. 6 This argument in-
fers that since Delaware did not take the initiative to assert legis-
latively the full degree of state jurisdiction compatible with the
Constitution," it is unconstitutional for it to assume otherwise
433 U.S. at 207, 212.
I ld. at 207 n.23. See also, Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130 (3d
Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring). Judge Gibbons wrote, "[a]lthough it can be argued
that the content of constitutional process due a litigant defending title to property will
vary from that due a litigant defending himself from liability in personam, there is no
reason to believe the Supreme Court presently recognizes such a distinction." 530 F.2d at
1133. But see, O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994, 997 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
Then the Court, in a decision following Shaffer, held that the kind of jurisdiction sought
(in rem, quasi in rem, or in personam) was a significant factor in the determination of
jurisdiction. This decision wrongly implied that the test of fairness varies in intensity
whether the action is brought against property or person. The action always must be fair
to the property owner, as delineated in International Shoe.
" 433 U.S. at 219. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I /d.
" 433 U.S. at 214.
" States need not assert jurisdiction to the full extent permissible under the Constitu-
tion. 433 U.S. at 219, 226-27 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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constitutional jurisdiction beyond the scope of its jurisdictional
statutes.
IV. EFFECTS OF THE COURT'S HOLDING
A. Actions Against Property
Even though International Shoe is now the basis for all asser-
tions of state court jurisdiction, actions may still be brought
under the traditional quasi in rem terminology. However, an ac-
tion against property must be examined anew under the
International Shoe test. 8 Thus, one may bring an action quasi in
rem against property, provided there is jurisdiction over the prop-
erty owner.9
Despite this possibility, a serious question arises as to the
utility, in most instances, of bringing the action against the prop-
erty. If the state must base jurisdiction on the International Shoe
test, it ordinarily would have in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant.100 There would be no restrictions on the extent of the
remedy. If one brought an action quasi in rem against the prop-
erty, the state would still have to have full in personam jurisdic-
tion over the owner. But, because the action was quasi in rem,
this could result in a judgment limited to the attached property
because the plaintiff elected a limited remedy.
One noteworthy exception to this analysis would be a divorce
proceeding where the court is adjudicating status. In a recent
state court decision following Shaffer, the court held that a di-
vorce action, where the wife was not subject to in personam juris-
diction, was still maintainable in rem.'01 Whether the state had
jurisdiction depended solely on International Shoe. But, the state
met the test because it had a vested interest in protecting its
citizens (the husband) and adjudicating the marriage status cre-
ated therein. 02 If the action had been brought in personam
, O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994, 997 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
" 443 U.S. at 208. In dicta the Court said: "It appears, therefore, that jurisdiction
over many types of actions which now are or might be brought in rem would not be affected
by a holding that any assertion of state court jurisdiction must satisfy the International
Shoe standard." (emphasis added). See, O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp.
994, 997 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Rinderknecht, 367 N.W.2d 1128 (Ind. App. 1977).
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203, 213 (1977).
101 In re Rinderknecht, 367 N.W.2d 1128, 1134 (Ind. App. 1977).
10 Under the International Shoe test there are situations where the vested interest of
the state in protecting its citizens is the dominant factor. This is an example of adjudica-
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against the wife the state would have lacked jurisdiction because




B. Intangible Property as a Factor in the Jurisdictional Test
The problems with attaching situs to intangible property
have not been solved completely by the ruling in Shaffer. The
attachment of situs to intangible property will continue to be
important simply because the defendant's property within the
forum may be a significant factor in the jurisdictional test. One
example is the role the intangible stock property played in
Shaffer. The defendants' stock was still located in Delaware due
to section 169,104 and since the stock was unrelated to the underly-
ing claim, it was not a significant factor in the jurisdictional
determination. 15 But, there are conceivable situations where sec-
tion 169 could be a crucial factor in the determination of jurisdic-
tion. One example might be where a dispute arose over control
of stock in a Delaware corporation. If Delaware could exert a
strong interest in regulating its corporate securities, 0 jurisdiction
might lie in that state because all the defendants had contacts
with Delaware concerning the nature of the controversy.
C. Colorado's Long Arm Statute
One very real consequence of Shaffer is its effect on state
attachment and long arm statutes. In Shaffer, section 366 was
unconstitutional because it provided for jurisdiction over prop-
tion of status. In such situations the state must provide a forum because one would not
exist otherwise. 433 U.S. at 208 n.30. But see, Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary,
37 TEX. L. REv. 657, 661 (1959).
303 In re Rincderknecht, 367 N.W.2d, 1128, 1135 (Ind. App. 1977).
304 Nowhere does the majority specifically state that section 169 is unconstitutional.
Under similar facts in U.S. Indus. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 143, 155 (3d Cir. 1976) the court did
not find section 169 unconstitutional. In fact, it used section 169 as a potential factor in
the International Shoe test.
" The Court in Shaffer wrote:
The Delaware courts based their assertion of jurisdiction in this case solely
on the statutory presence [§ 169] of appellants' property in Delaware. Yet
that property is not the subject matter of this litigation, nor is the underlying
cause of action related to the property. Appellants' holdings in Greyhound
do not, therefore, provide contacts with Delaware sufficient to support the
jurisdiction of that State's courts over appellants. If it exists the jurisdiction
must have some other foundation.
433 U.S. at 213.
' At 219 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
At the beginning of the opinion the majority wrote that-the controversy "concerns
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erty in disregard of any test of fairness to the property owner. 07
Since the lack of fairness in section 366 was a constitutional issue,
the holding necessarily affects similar statutes in the remaining
forty-nine states.0 8
Colorado's long arm statute provides that the ownership of
real property in the state subjects the owner, without further
consideration, to the in personam jurisdiction of the state.09
Under Shaffer this provision lacks constitutional muster because,
like section 366, it makes no provision for a weighing of other
factors. As the majority in Shaffer noted, there may be significant
factors beyond the mere physical presence of the defendants'
property which have a direct bearing on the existence of jurisdic-
tion. " 0 Even though the Colorado provision often may achieve the
same results, its conceptual framework is contrary to the spirit of
Shaffer. I' It is traditionally quasi in rem because the presence of
property and not the defendant's contacts determine jurisdiction.
D. Jurisdiction to Attach as Security: An Exception
One recent decision following Shaffer has made a significant
exception to the applicability of the International Shoe test in the
attachment of property. Applying dicta in Shaffer, a federal dis-
trict court in Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranet"I permitted
the attachment of property in California even though that state
did not have jurisdiction over the property owners. However, the
property was attached only as security for suit in another state.
The property was not used as the basis for jurisdiction to adjudi-
the constitutionality of a Delaware statute [section 3661 that allows a court of that State
to take property of the defendant that happens to be located in Delaware." 433 U.S. at
189. The Court did not specifically state that section 366 was unconstitutional but this
language combined with the broad ruling in Shaffer makes this conclusion unavoidable.
If it were not unconstitutional, Delaware could continue to sequester property within its
borders without regard for the International Shoe test.
'' 433 U.S. at 219 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
' COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-1-124(c) (1973). "Engaging in any act enumerated in this
statute, whether or not a resident of the state of Colorado . . .submits such person...
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state concerning any cause of action arising from
(c) The ownership, use or possession of any real estate situated in the state .... "
It is noteworthy that the statute restricts actions to obligations arising out of the
property owner's contact. In this sense the statute is in keeping with the majority in
Shaffer. See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
"' See text accompanying note 70 supra.
I See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
- F. Supp. -, (N.D. Cal. 1977) (46 U.S.L.W. 2194).
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cate the merits of a controversy in California and therefore the
International Shoe test did not apply.
The majority in Shaffer wrote: "A state in which the property
is located should have jurisdiction to attach the property, by use
of proper procedures, as security for a judgment being sought in
a forum where the litigation can be maintained consistently with
International Shoe. 113 The effect of this proviso was to recognize
a distinction between jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits and
jurisdiction to attach property as security for a judgment in an-
other state on the merits. The requirements of this jurisdiction to
attach property as security were, according to the decision in
Carolina Light, (1) The presence of the property in the security
state should not be fortuitous, (2) the attachment comport with
due process procedure, and (3) the Full Faith and Credit Clause
could not otherwise achieve the same results."'
The potential value of this attachment device is significant
because it assures at least some satisfaction of judgment, like
traditional quasi in rem actions, while still requiring a fair forum
to adjudicate the merits. The only negative aspect in the use of
such an attachment procedure would be the bifurcation of the
suit.
PROSPECTIVE
With the demise of Pennoyer v. Neff, all assertions of state
court jurisdiction are now based on fairness to the defendant.
However, within the concepts of due process fairness remain
many of the vestiges of the old power of the state theory. For
example, domicile, residence, and presence, which automatically
create jurisdiction over the defendant and which are based on the
power of the state, are incorporated into the International Shoe
test. Several commentators have suggested that these automatic
determinations are harmful to the spirit of the fairness because
fairness should not be so mechanical."' It follows from Shaffer
ItS 433 U.S. at 210.
-1 - F. Supp. -, (N.D. Cal. 1977) (46 U.S.L.W. 2194). In Carolina Light the
suit was in arbitration and the Full Faith and Credit Clause would not apply to any award.
See generally, Folk & Moyer, supra note 16.
' Presence of the defendant has always been sufficient in itself to create jurisdiction.
Although presence does promote "an orderly administration of the laws", International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945), there are situations where presence
alone is not fair to the defendant. The situation in Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442
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that if jurisdiction is no longer fair when it is based on a sole
determination of the presence of property, then perhaps it is un-
fair to base jurisdiction automatically on the presence of the de-
fendant. Of course, under the Shaffer rationale, residence, domi-
cile, and presence should be significant factors in evidencing
ties between the defendant, the state, and the litigation; but,
they should not be the sole, determinative factors."6 If fairness
involves any sort of weighing process, other factors besides
presence, domicile, or residence should be considered, when
applicable, in the jurisdictional test.
Even without these suggested changes, the substantive
changes arising out of Shaffer v. Heitner will do much to disrupt
any assurances where jurisdiction rests. The practicing attorney
can no longer bank on mechanical determinations of jurisdiction.
These changes also will tend to prolong and confuse litigation,
particularly as jurisdiction is a threshold issue. However, the shift
in orientation to the defendant property owner and his contacts
with the forum state is the only fair approach in an assertion of
state court jurisdiction.
John S. Upton
(E.D. Ark. 1959) illustrates this possibility. There the defendant was present in Arkansas,
for jurisdictional purposes, when he was served notice on a nonstop plane flying over the
state. His simple physical presence was so fortuitous that it should not have been enough
to subject him to jurisdiction in the state.
The mechanical use of residence or domiciliary is also objectionable as the sole basis
for jurisdiction. This is particularly true with corporations. Since a corporation is a resi-
dent of that state where it is incorporated, MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT § 11, it is
subject to all suits brought against it in that state regardless of such factors as where the
cause of action arose, the nature of the suit, or the corporation's business in the incorpo-
rating state. In Shaffer v. Heitner it may have been unfair to automatically subject
Greyhound to suit in Delaware without at least considering some of these other factors.
Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAav. L. REv. 909, 933 (1960).

